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NOTES
Signed, Sealed, Delivered-Not Yours:
Why the Fair Labor Standards Act
Offers a Framework for Regulating
Gestational Surrogacy
Over the past several decades, gestational surrogacy has emerged
as a rapidly growing industry. Such growth has prompted an enormous
amount of debate among scholars, human rights advocates, economists,
and the media over a wide array of legal and ethical issues. This debate
is perhaps most evident in the divergence of state approaches to the
regulation of gestational surrogacy-for example, some states ban the
practice entirely, others allow only altruistic arrangements, and many
states simply do not address urrogacy at all. The fractured landscape
of surrogacy regulation has resulted in artificially high costs and, often,
uncertainty for all parties involved. As such, the time has arrived for
federal regulation of commercial surrogacy arrangements. This Note
proposes that the Fair Labor Standards Act, originally enacted to
prevent labor abuses and ensure wage and hour protection, offers a
tenable statutory framework for regulating commercial surrogacy
arrangements, as federal oversight will promote accountability among
parties and further legitimize the surrogacy industry.
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And God blessed them, and God said to them, 'Be
fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth."
-Genesis'
INTRODUCTION
In February of 1985, William ("Bill") Stern entered into a life-
changing contract.2 As the only child of Holocaust survivors, Bill
desperately hoped to continue his family's bloodline.3 Unfortunately,
his wife, Elizabeth, suffered from multiple sclerosis and feared that a
pregnancy would jeopardize her health.4 The substantial delay involved
in adoption, coupled with Bill's desire for a biological child, ultimately
led the Sterns to the Infertility Center of New York ("ICNY') operated
by Michigan attorney Noel Keane.5 Established in 1981, ICNY selected
potential surrogates through a screening process and-for a substantial
brokerage fee6- provided infertile couples the opportunity to interview
a variety of preapproved surrogate candidates, furnished the contract
between the parties, and arranged for doctors to artificially inseminate
the surrogate mother with the contracting father's sperm.' Keane,
1. Genesis 1:28.
2. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988); see also Carol Sanger, Developing Markets
in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 67, 68 (2007).
3. Sanger, supra note 2, at 68.
4. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235.
5. Id. After arranging his first surrogacy contract in 1976, Keane developed a nationwide
surrogacy business. By 1987, Keane had arranged several hundred surrogacy agreements. James
S. Kunen, Childless Couples Seeking Surrogate Mothers Call Michigan Lawyer Noel Keane-He
Delivers, PEOPLE (Mar. 30, 1987), http://people.com/archive/childless-couples-seeking-surrogate-
mothers-call-michigan-lawyer-noel-keane-he-delivers-vol-27-no- 13/ [https://perma.ccRVS5-
W8EF].
6. For example, the Sterns paid $7,500 for ICNY's services. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at
1235.
7. Id.; Sanger, supra note 2, at 84. ICNY selected surrogates based on the results of a
detailed questionnaire regarding a potential surrogate's health and income, as well as a
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hailed in 1987 by Time magazine as "America's undisputed father of
surrogate motherhood," solicited potential surrogate mothers to apply
to ICNY through classified advertisements, television talk shows, and
radio appearances.8
The Sterns sought ICNY's services after seeing a newspaper ad
for surrogate mothers and recalling Keane's prior television
appearances.9 After reviewing hundreds of surrogate applications
provided by ICNY, the Sterns selected Mary Beth Whitehead, a married
mother of two who had expressed a desire to give another couple the
"gift of life and the joys of parenthood" as their surrogate.10 The Sterns
selected Mary Whitehead specifically because they believed that her
husband's vasectomy indicated the Whiteheads' evident desire to avoid
having more children of their own." Thus, on February 6, 1985, Bill
and Whitehead executed a surrogacy contract, which provided for
Whitehead's artificial insemination by a physician with Bill's sperm in
exchange for $10,000 to be paid upon Whitehead's immediate surrender
of custody of the child to Bill and immediate termination of her parental
rights. 12
Unfortunately, a dispute arose as soon as Whitehead gave birth
to a healthy baby girl, who subsequently became known "around the
world as Baby M." 13 Having developed an emotional bond to the baby,
Whitehead refused to fulfill her contractual obligation and instead fled
the state with Baby M. 1 4 Three months later, police located Whitehead
in Florida and executed a court order requiring her to surrender custody
of the baby to the Sterns.15 The Sterns subsequently sought
psychological evaluation of a potential surrogate's ability to provide informed consent. See Sanger,
supra note 2, at 85.
8. Kunen, supra note 5.
9. Sanger, supra note 2, at 85.
10. Id. at 86.
11. Id.
12. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1265-69; see also Clyde Haberman, Baby M and the Question
of Surrogate Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/us/
baby-m-and-the-question-of-surrogate-motherhood.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9HKQ-LTK2]
(explaining that $10,000 in 1985 is equivalent to $22,000 today). The average rates of
compensation for surrogates today are discussed infra Section I.A. Further, it is worth noting that
while the contract gave Elizabeth Stern sole custody of the child in the event of Bill Stern's death,
Elizabeth was not party to the surrogacy contract-presumably to avoid violating New Jersey's
baby-selling statute. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54, repealed by 1993 N.J. Laws ch. 345, § 20
(prohibiting the payment or acceptance of money in connection with any placement of a child for
adoption).
13. Sanger, supra note 2, at 68.
14. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1237.
15. Id.
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enforcement of the entire surrogacy contract, specifically the
termination of Whitehead's parental rights, in New Jersey. 16
Following a six-week trial, the court declared the surrogacy
contract valid, emphasizing the child's best interests, and ordered the
termination of Whitehead's parental and custodial rights.1 7 On appeal,
however, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the trial court's
rationale and declared surrogacy contracts "illegal, perhaps criminal,
and potentially degrading to women."1 8 New Jersey's condemnation of
surrogacy contracts as counter to both public policy and state law
immediately sparked a national debate over the legal and ethical
implications of surrogacy contracts.19
Nearly thirty years have passed since the New Jersey Supreme
Court delivered its verdict in In re Baby M. Although the surrogacy20
industry in the United States has evolved from its marginalized roots
into a multimillion-dollar business,2 1 the "legal, moral, and ethical
issues" (such as the potential for exploitation, the commodification of
children, and the often uncertain nature of establishing legal
parentage) inherent in commercial surrogacy contracts remain wholly
unresolved.22  Commercial surrogacy refers to a surrogacy
arrangement23 in which the commissioning couple agrees to pay the
surrogate a fee for her services, as opposed to altruistic surrogacy
arrangements where a surrogate carries a child to term without the
16. Id. The distinction between custodial and parental rights (i.e., legal parentage) is
particularly important, as the two are not coextensive. A parent who has lost physical custody of
a child remains the child's legal parent until his or her parental rights are legally terminated. See,
e.g., In re Jones, 340 N.E.2d 269, 273 (111. App. Ct. 1975) (explaining that a custody proceeding
focuses on the best interests of the child, while a termination of parental rights proceeding involves
determining whether a parent is unfit such that a permanent termination of a relation between
the parent and child is warranted).
17. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1237-38.
18. See id. at 1234, 1238 (while the court ultimately granted Bill Stern custody, the court
remanded the case for proper determination of Whitehead's visitation rights-thereby recognizing
Whitehead's parental rights).
19. See Sanger, supra note 2, at 69.
20. Henceforth, unless otherwise specified, the term "surrogacy" refers to the practice itself-
that is, a woman carrying a child to term for someone else's benefit.
21. See Morgan Holcomb & Mary Patricia Byrn, When Your Body Is Your Business, 85 WASH.
L. REV. 647, 651 (2010) (estimating that for-profit surrogacy agencies "are at the center of a $75-
150 million-per-year industry").
22. Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a
Commodification of Women's Bodies and Children?, 12WiS.WOMEN'S L.J. 113, 115 (1997); see also
J.K. MASON, MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF REPRODUCTION AND PARENTHOOD 267-68 (2d ed. 1998)
(noting the clear economic distinction between the Sterns, a comfortable middle-class couple, and
Whitehead, a high-school dropout married to an alcoholic, as illustrative of surrogacy's potentially
exploitative effects).
23. Throughout this Note, "arrangement" will be used to denote the general agreement
between parties, while "contract" will refer to the legally binding agreement between parties. Both
terms, however, are used to refer to formal agreements.
288
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expectation of compensation.24 Opponents of such arrangements argue
that the practice threatens traditional notions of family formation and
fragments the role of motherhood.25 Other commentators condemn
commercial surrogacy on the grounds that it relegates women and
children to reproductive commodities, and is tantamount to both
prostitution and "baby-selling."26 These opponents further maintain
that commercial surrogacy contracts should uniformly be void because
such contracts "cannot properly[ ] be based upon true best interests
determinations" of individual children.27 However, advocates for
commercial surrogacy believe that it offers a viable alternative
reproductive method for otherwise infertile couples.28 And, some
scholars advocate for the regulation of the commercial surrogacy
industry to minimize the potentially exploitative effects on
surrogates.29
The differing jurisdictional approaches to both commercial and
altruistic surrogacy further complicate the matter in the United
States.30 State legislatures' responses to surrogacy as a general practice
range from full acceptance and enforcement of commercial contracts
and altruistic agreements to outright bans on any form of surrogacy
accompanied by criminal penalties.31 Even among states that permit
some form of surrogacy, there is no uniform approach-some states
allow compensation of surrogates while others only permit altruistic
arrangements.32 More importantly, the majority of states have yet to
adopt any position on the legality of surrogacy at all. 33
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14(4) (West 2017); VA CODE ANN. § 20-160(b)(4) (West
2017).
25. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., COLUMBIA LAW SCH. SEXUALITY & GENDER LAW CLINIC, SURROGAGY
LAW AND POLICY IN THE U.S.: A NATIONAL CONVERSATION INFORMED BY GLOBAL LAWMAKING 41
(2016) ("'Surrogacy upsets the moral framework in which reproduction is regarded as a 'natural
family,'" and is an "'invalid' form of family formation." (citing ELLY TEMAN, BIRTHING A MOTHER:
THE SURROGATE BODY AND THE PREGNANT SELF 7 (2010))).
26. See, e.g., David M. Smolin, Surrogacy as the Sale of Children: Applying Lessons Learned
from Adoption to the Regulating of the Surrogacy Industry's Global Marketing of Children, 43
PEPP. L. REV. 265, 269 (2016); see also Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, by Other
Means, if Necessary: The Time Has Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy
Agreements, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 799, 822 (2012) (recognizing that some scholars categorize
surrogacy services as a commodity).
27. Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the
Best Interests of Children?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 429, 467 (2004).
28. Kerian, supra note 22, at 115.
29. See generally Stephen Wilkinson, The Exploitation Argument Against Commercial
Surrogacy, 17 BIOETHICS 169 (2003).
30. See Mark Hansen, As Surrogacy Becomes More Popular, Legal Problems Proliferate,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 2011, at 53, 57.
31. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 9.
32. Id.
33. Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 800.
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Accordingly, parties who wish to procreate by means of
surrogacy must navigate a legal minefield. The drastically different
state approaches to surrogacy as a general practice have increased the
potential for custody disputes, introducing an element of uncertainty
for both prospective parents and surrogates.34 Likewise, the
inconsistency among states has increased the cost of all surrogacy
arrangements-whether commercial or altruistic-by artificially
limiting the supply of legally available gestational surrogates and the
cost of assisted reproduction.35 Yet, while the dangers of a fractured
market illustrate the pressing need for uniform regulation of
gestational, commercial surrogacy, the question remains as to how to
establish a system that accommodates uch a wide range of competing
interests.3 6
This Note argues that there is no need to create a new system to
regulate gestational, commercial surrogacy agreements because the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") provides an existing framework
that accounts for the needs of intended parentS37 and surrogates. As
previously stated, opponents argue that gestational, commercial
surrogacy is inherently exploitative and that it therefore puts women of
lower socioeconomic status at risk of abuse.38 Originally enacted in the
New Deal era, the FLSA was explicitly designed to protect such
populations: vulnerable members of the labor force.39 Characterizing
surrogates as employees and requiring intended parents to adhere to
the FLSA's minimum wage requirement will protect gestational,
commercial surrogates from exploitation and promote reproductive
autonomy by allowing women to choose the occupation of gestational
surrogacy. Subjecting the intended parents and potential surrogates to
federal oversight will also foster a degree of accountability between the
contracting parties, thereby mitigating the risk of heartbreaking legal
battles like the one between the Sterns and the Whiteheads in In re
Baby M.40 Since the FLSA covers only employees, not independent
contractors, the statute provides the contracting parties with a degree
of flexibility if the arrangement is an altruistic one among friends or
34. See infra Section II.C.
35. Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 800, 808.
36. See, e.g., Dominique Ladomato, Protecting Traditional Surrogacy Contracting Through
Fee Payment Regulation, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 245, 265 (2012) ("[R]egulation of ...
surrogacy contracts hould be federal in nature.").
37. The term "intended parents" refers to the individuals who will raise the child after a
surrogate gives birth. See FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 5.
38. See infra Section II.A.
39. See Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a
Minimum Wage, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1978, at 22, 24-28.
40. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988).
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family rather than an arms-length transaction (i.e., a gestational,
commercial surrogacy contract). Finally, regulating such surrogacy
agreements under a preexisting statutory framework will circumvent
challenges to Congress's constitutional authority to regulate
surrogacy.4 1
This Note will analyze the current legal landscape governing
gestational, commercial surrogacy as well as the viability of regulating
it under the FLSA, demonstrating that regulation under the statute
will promote uniformity without raising constitutional concerns and
that such uniformity will, in turn, protect both surrogates and intended
parents. Part I provides a brief overview of the surrogacy industry, and
outlines the three main legal approaches to surrogacy as a general
practice in the United States. Part II first presents and rebuts two of
the most common arguments proffered by opponents of gestational,
commercial surrogacy: that the practice exploits the surrogate and
ultimately threatens the child. Part II then demonstrates why the lack
of a uniform regulatory scheme poses a pressing problem for both
intended parents and surrogates. Finally, Part III posits that the FLSA
offers an appropriate framework for regulating the gestational,
commercial surrogacy industry. In proposing this framework of
regulation, Part III explains how the FLSA-which from its inception
has restricted freedom of contract to resolve issues implicating public
policy-offers a suitable vehicle for regulating gestational, commercial
surrogate contracts. This Note concludes that the increasing prevalence
of gestational surrogacy arrangements indicates that the question is no
longer whether the practice should be regulated; rather, the question
today is simply how to regulate it. The answer to that question lies
within the FLSA.
I. MODERN FAMILIES: AN OVERVIEW OF SURROGACY IN THE UNITED
STATES
Surrogacy, defined as "carrying a child to term for the benefit of
someone else," is no longer practiced only at the fringes of society. 42 The
advent of assisted reproductive technology ("ART"') has catapulted
commercial surrogacy, gestational or otherwise, into a "booming global
business," with the Permanent Bureau of the Hague estimating that
the industry grew one thousand percent internationally between 2006
and 2010.43 Despite the increasing frequency of surrogacy
41. See infra Section III.B.
42. Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 799.
43. See FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 6.
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arrangements-both commercial and altruistic-the United States
lacks a uniform federal stance and leaves regulation to the states,
resulting in fifty different approaches that "run the gamut from
acceptance to prohibition."4 4 Such variance has spawned a litany of
legal and ethical consequences, thus warranting federal interference.
This Part begins by offering background on the technicalities of
surrogacy as a general practice and the nature of the industry in the
United States, and then details the three primary approaches states
follow in regulating surrogacy.
A. The Booming Baby Business
Surrogacy comes in two forms: traditional and gestational.45
Under a traditional surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate provides the
egg, thereby becoming the child's "genetic progenitor."46 By contrast,
gestational surrogacy refers to an agreement in which the surrogate is
impregnated via ART and bears no genetic relationship to the child.47
Unlike traditional surrogacy, gestational surrogacy arrangements do
not implicate concerns about a surrogate's ability to contractually
abdicate her parental rights because, by definition, the surrogate lacks
a natural, genetic relationship to the child.48 Although gestational
surrogacy only became possible in 1978 with the advent of in vitro
fertilization ("IVF"), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
("CDC") found that between 1999 and 2013, gestational surrogacy
arrangements resulted in the birth of approximately 18,400 children.49
Because gestational surrogacy is preferred in most cases, and is far
more common than traditional surrogacy, this Note only pertains to
gestational surrogacy arrangements-commercial or otherwise.5o
44. Richard F. Storrow, Surrogacy: American Style, in SURROGAGY, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
193, 216 (Paula Gerber & Katie O'Byrne eds., 2015).
45. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 5.
46. Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 801. For example, because Whitehead provided the egg, In
re Baby M dealt with a traditional surrogacy arrangement. 537 A.2d 1227, 1236 (N.J. 1988).
47. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 5.
48. Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 802.
49. ART and Gestational Carriers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/art/key-findings/gestational-carriers.html (last updated Aug. 5, 2016)
[https://perma.cclJQD4-3YCK]. Additionally, the number of gestational carrier cycles more than
tripled between 1999 (727) and 2013 (3,432), and statistics suggest that ninety-five percent of
surrogacies today in the United States are gestational. See id.; see also Diane S. Hinson & Maureen
McBrien, Surrogacy Across America, FAM. ADVOC., Fall 2011, at 32, 35; Marsha Darling,
Commercial Surrogacy and the Cost of Reproductive "Freedom," COUNCI FOR RESPONSIBLE
GENETICS, http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/GeneWatchlGeneWatchPage
.aspx?pageld=357 (last visited Oct. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cclNY9E-GWNS] (noting that the
number of babies born to gestational surrogates increased by eighty-nine percent from 2004-2008).
50. See Storrow, supra note 44, at 200.
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SIGNED, SEALED, DELIVERED
Gestational surrogacy agreements are either altruistic or
commercial. Altruistic surrogacy refers to situations in which a
surrogate agrees to carry a child without asking for compensation, with
the potential exception of reimbursement for legal, medical, and other
pregnancy-related expenses.51 Commercial surrogacy involves the
payment of a surrogate beyond reimbursement for such expenses.52
Despite the varied manner in which states approach commercial
surrogacy contracts, gestational surrogacy is a universally expensive
undertaking. In any given arrangement, intended parents must
anticipate inevitable medical, legal, and health insurance costs.
Moreover, in states that permit commercial surrogacy, intended
parents will incur fees paid to the surrogates, as well as a surrogacy
agency's fees-if, of course, the parties choose to use an agency. In the
United States, medical costs range between $20,000 and $80,000; legal
fees between $3,000 and $15,000; agency charges between $6,000 and
$54,000; and average payments to surrogates between $20,000 and
$55,000.53 Since for-profit surrogacy agencies facilitate the vast
majority of commercial surrogacy contracts in the United States, such
agencies are "at the center of a $75-150 million-per-year industry."54
Accordingly, even in states that only permit altruistic surrogacy
arrangements, it is reasonable to anticipate that "some money will
change hands."5 5
B. Divergent State Law Approaches
While regulation of surrogacy in the United States "stands as a
microcosm of the rest of the world, with the whole range of global
attitudes towards surrogacy subsumed within its borders," the fifty
state approaches to regulation of the practice are divisible into roughly
three categories: (1) surrogacy is expressly prohibited; (2) surrogacy is
51. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(4) (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(4) (West
2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.230 (West 2017).
52. See FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 5 (defining commercial surrogacy as "surrogacy
arrangements in which the surrogate is paid a fee above and beyond reimbursement for 'reasonable
expenses' ').
53. Id. Although beyond the scope of this Note, whether the cost of surrogacy should be
covered by insurance and to what degree surrogates should report income to the Internal Revenue
Service are also of interest when discussing the cost of any form of surrogacy. See Storrow, supra
note 44, at 206-07 (examining how some states have treated insurance coverage for surrogates,
and the extent to which compensated surrogate mothers can expect o pay federal and state income
taxes).
54. Holcomb & Byrn, supra note 21, at 651.
55. Storrow, supra note 44, at 206.
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expressly allowed; and (3) surrogacy has not yet been addressed. 56 The
following sections detail each approach in turn.
1. States Banning Surrogacy
Although the modern legislative landscape favors legalizing
some form of surrogacy, five states still explicitly ban the practice in its
entirety.57 Bans on surrogacy involve either an outright prohibition-
via legislative or judicial action-or an imposition of penalties on the
intended parents, the surrogate, and the surrogacy agency.58 The
majority of states that ban all forms of surrogacy are primarily
concerned with eliminating commercial surrogacy contracts, although
state bans vary in degree.59 For example, New York imposes a civil
penalty of up to $500 on the parties to a commercial surrogacy contract
and fines an agency that facilitates such a contract up to $10,000.60
Similarly, until April 2017, the District of Columbia levied a civil
penalty of up to $10,000 and a criminal penalty of up to a year
imprisonment for brokering surrogacy contracts.61 Perhaps the state
with the harshest ban is Michigan, in which the relevant portion of its
statute forbidding surrogacy provides:
(2) A participating party ... who knowingly enters into a surrogate parentage contract
for compensation is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than
$10,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both.
(3) A person other than a participating party who induces, arranges, procures, or
otherwise assists in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract for compensation is
guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of not more than $50,000.00 or imprisonment for not
more than 5 years, or both. 62
By contrast, several states purport to ban surrogacy by declaring
all forms of surrogacy contracts void, but, at the same time, these
56. Id. at 193.
57. See id. at 198; see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402(b) (West 2017) (repealed Apr. 7, 2017);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859 (West 2017); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 123 (McKinney 2017); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1988)
(invalidating a surrogacy contract because such an agreement conflicted with the laws and public
policy of New Jersey).
58. See Storrow, supra note 44, at 199 (discussing the different means by which states have
discouraged or prohibited surrogacy).
59. See id.
60. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 123.
61. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402(b) (repealed Apr. 7, 2017).
62. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.859 (emphasis added). Although challenged on due process
grounds in 1992, this statute was upheld and remains in full force today. See Doe v. Attorney Gen.,
487 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting the notion that the Michigan statute "violates
the due process guarantee of freedom from government interference in matters of marriage, family,
procreation, and intimate association").
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statutes do not impose civil or criminal punishment. 63 While such laws
leave parties without recourse if a dispute arises, the absence of
punishment does allow individuals to arrange for procreation via
surrogacy and simply rely on adoption laws, rather than parentage
orders, to finalize the desired parentage designations.64 To illustrate, a
couple in Indiana seeking to enforce a surrogacy contract via a state
judicial proceeding would be unable to do so, as the relevant statute
provides that "it is against public policy to enforce any term of a
surrogate agreement."65 However, that same couple would not be
penalized for using a surrogate's services and ultimately acquiring legal
parentage of the child through adoption laws.6 6 This so-called "adoption
model" of surrogacy lacks the assurance of parentage embodied in a true
surrogacy contract. Nevertheless, this workaround provides an
alternative-albeit a contractually unenforceable one-to both
commercial and altruistic surrogacy in states that facially appear to ban
the practice in its entirety.67
2. States Where Surrogacy Is Expressly Permissible
Currently, fourteen states have statutes that authorize some
form of gestational surrogacy.68 However, a great deal of variation
exists within these surrogacy-friendly states. For example, Florida,
New Hampshire, Texas, Utah, and Virginia provide for the enforcement
of gestational surrogate contracts, but require that intended parents be
married, reside within the respective state, and possess a medical need
for surrogacy.69 Other states require a showing that at least one of the
intended parents bears a genetic relationship to the child. 70 In a similar
63. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN § 25-21,200(1) (LexisNexis 2017).
64. See Storrow, supra note 44, at 199 (noting that such laws do not serve as true surrogacy
bans because parties may still agree to the creation of a child and carry out their aims through
adoption law).
65. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West 2017).
66. See id.
67. See Storrow, supra note 44, at 199-200 ("[The adoption model] asks that we remove the
taint of payment for the surrender of a child from the arrangement, not that we disallow the
arrangement entirely.").
68. See FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 9. This Note is only concerned with the legality
of gestational surrogacy; however, certain "surrogacy friendly" jurisdictions that permit
gestational surrogacies still forbid traditional surrogacy arrangements. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 14-18-05 (West 2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754 (West 2017).
69. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1) (West 2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17 (2017);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.754(b), 160.756(b)(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(b)
(LexisNexis 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(8) (West 2017); see also Arshagouni, supra note 26,
at 806 (explaining that "medical need for surrogacy" generally means that the intended mother
cannot safely carry a child to term).
70. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(8).
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vein, some states heavily regulate who can serve as a surrogate, while
others impose no such restrictions.7 1 Certain states require-where
applicable-that a surrogate's husband expressly agree to the terms of
a contract, while others do not require that a surrogate's spouse provide
consent to the surrogacy arrangement.72
Moreover, the process of establishing legal parentage (i.e.
parental rights) varies greatly from state to state.7 3 California, the most
surrogacy-friendly state in the country,74 permits parents to file for
parentage orders before a child is born.75 This line of reasoning,
announced by the California Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert,
recognizes the rights of intended parents in all surrogate agreements.76
However, courts in other states, such as Florida, Texas, and Virginia,
will not issue a birth certificate granting parental rights unless the
intended parents file a petition with a court after the child's birth.77 The
consequences of the various state approaches to determining parental
rights are discussed infra in Section II.C.
With regard to compensation, surrogacy permissive states are
likewise "all over the proverbial map."78 Florida forbids compensation
of gestational surrogates beyond any "reasonable living, legal, medical,
psychological, and psychiatric expenses" incurred during and after the
pregnancy.79 Other states forbid individual brokers or agencies from
71. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(b) (requiring the gestational mother to have
had at least one pregnancy and delivery prior to entering into a surrogacy agreement); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-160(B)(8) (providing that the surrogate mother must submit to a home study by a local
department of social services); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.220 (West 2017) (forbidding an
unemancipated minor from entering into a surrogacy contract).
72. Compare 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25(c)(2) (West 2017) (requiring consent of
surrogate's husband), with NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.770(1)-(2) (West 2017) (consent of legal
spouse or domestic partner not required).
73. See FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 9. Compare 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
47/25(c)(4)(i) (requiring a surrogacy contract to provide for the "express written agreement of the
intended parents to accept custody of the child immediately upon his or her birth"), with VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-160(D) (stating that intended parents "shall file a written notice with the court that the
child was born to the surrogate within 300 days after the last performance of assisted conception"
before the court will enter an order directing the state to issue a new birth certificate naming the
intended parents as the parents of the child).
74. See Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 807 (stating that "California has the most permissive
approach toward surrogacy services").
75. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(e) (West 2017).
76. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) ("[S]he who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is the natural
mother under California law.").
77. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.16(1) (West 2017); TEx. FAM. CODEANN. § 160.760 (West 2017);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(D).
78. Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 808.
79. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.16(1); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(D); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.26.230 (West 2017).
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brokering any surrogacy contract in exchange for compensation.80 In a
different vein, Maine recently updated its Parentage Act to allow for a
surrogate's compensation that is "reasonable" and "negotiated in good
faith."81 Nevada and Utah likewise take a more permissive approach to
the compensation of surrogates and have provisions similar to Maine's
governing the compensation of surrogates.82
3. States Where Surrogacy Is Not Clearly Addressed
Despite the increasing prevalence of gestational surrogacy, the
vast majority of states have yet to explicitly address the legal status of
the practice. Such uncertainty creates complex disputes, forcing
intended parents and potential surrogates to discern from adoption
statutes or case law the enforceability of a potential surrogacy
arrangement, altruistic or otherwise. For example, commentators
consider Oregon a surrogacy-friendly state because the state issues
prebirth parentage orders.83 Similarly, Iowa appears to implicitly
condone surrogacy by explicitly excluding surrogacy from its statute
defining human trafficking.8 4 Yet, neither Oregon nor Iowa have
squarely issued an opinion on surrogacy. Conversely, an attorney
general opinion from Kentucky suggests that surrogacy contracts
violate Kentucky's ban on selling children.8 5 Roughly thirty-one states
have similarly opaque approaches to surrogacy. Without relevant case
law or statutes, the degree of enforceability of surrogacy contracts
remains uncertain in over half the states.8 6
Such uncertainty has produced a variety of complex disputes
with uncertain outcomes. To illustrate, in 2015, a Pennsylvania judge
ruled that an intended mother-with no biological connection to the
gestational child-could not disavow the surrogacy contract that she
and her husband (the intended father) had entered into prior to
divorcing each other and thus had to remain the legal mother of the
80. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(IV) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.230.
81. Maine Parentage Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-a, § 1932(4) (2016).
82. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.810 (West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(h)
(LexisNexis 2017).
83. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 11.
84. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 710.11 (West 2017) ("A person commits a class 'C' felony when the
person purchases or sells or attempts to purchase or sell an individual to another person. This
section does not apply to a surrogate mother arrangement.").
85. See Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-18 (Ky. 1981); see also 85 Op. Att'y Gen. 348 (Md. 2000)
(suggesting surrogacy agreements are unlawful due to their close relation to adoption-for-pay
agreements).
86. See Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 808 (finding that "it is entirely unclear how enforceable
such [surrogacy] contracts would be in those states").
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child.87 Because Pennsylvania had no statute addressing the
enforceability of such a contract, it was unclear from the outset whether
the intended mother or the intended father would prevail. Even more
recently, a gestational surrogate appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court
in hopes of gaining custody of the child she delivered.88 As this small
sampling of stories illustrates-and as discussed in greater detail
infra-the legal uncertainty surrounding the enforceability of
surrogacy contracts has the potential to devastate surrogates, intended
parents, and, of course, the children born through such arrangements.
II. WOMB SERVICE: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
UNREGULATED COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
The rapid growth of the commercial surrogacy industry has
prompted a number of arguments in opposition to the practice. This
Part presents and rebuts two of the most oft-cited objections to
commercial surrogacy: (1) surrogacy is an exploitative practice that
harms the women who serve as surrogates; and (2) commercial
surrogacy is detrimental to the children borne of such arrangements
because it reduces them to commodities. After evaluating these
objections, this Part concludes that the most effective means of avoiding
any potential-albeit unlikely-exploitation of surrogates or
commodification of children is to bring surrogacy into the fold of federal
regulation.
A. Service or Servitude?
Opponents of commercial surrogacy frequently attack the
practice on moral grounds, arguing that compensating surrogates is an
inherently exploitative practice.89 Of primary concern to many is the
presumed socioeconomic inequity between a surrogate and the intended
parents-the fear that widespread commercial surrogacy will
perpetuate an "unacceptable class distinction whereby rich, barren
87. William J. Giacomo & Angela DiBiasi, Mommy (and Daddy) Dearest: Determining
Parental Rights and Enforceability of Surrogacy Agreements, N.Y. ST. B. AsS'N J., July/Aug. 2015,
at 18, 18; Jessica Grose, The Sherri Sheppard Surrogacy Case Is a Mess. Prepare for More Like It.,
SLATE (Apr. 28, 2015, 5:54 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx-factor/2015/04/28/
sherri_shepherdsurrogacy-case-there s littleconsensus on the-ethical-dimensions.html
[https://perma.cc/SE3H-X97P].
88. Ellen Trachman, Extreme Surrogacy Nightmare Heads to Iowa Supreme Court, ABOVE L.
(June 28, 2017, 4:42 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2017/06/extreme-surrogacy-nightmare-heads-to-
iowa-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/QA82-B8PC].
89. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 29, at 170.
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women benefit at the expense of poor, fertile women."90 Proponents of
this view worry that "a pool of surrogates could well be created on the
model of working class prostitution."9 1 Many further oppose the practice
because they believe that prospective surrogates cannot fully grasp ex
ante the physical and psychological risks associated with carrying
another couple's child to term.92 Under this view, a surrogate's inability
to provide informed consent would invalidate any type of surrogacy
contract at the outset. However, these arguments all rest on the
paternalistic assumption that the majority of gestational surrogates are
of a lower socioeconomic status than the intended parents, lack
alternative means of earning an income, and are thus ripe for
exploitation.93
Despite the dismal predictions about its consequences, the
exploitative nature of commercial surrogacy has yet to be substantiated
by empirical data.94 Recent studies do not suggest a growing pool of
desperate, reproductive prostitutes.9 5 On the contrary, the available
research suggests that surrogates are generally Caucasian, Christian
women in their late twenties or early thirties, many of whom have
achieved some degree of higher education and who are generally
"mature, experienced, stable, self-aware, and extroverted non-
90. Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the Millennium:
Proposed Model Legislation Regulating 'Non-Traditional" Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 31
McGEORGE L. REV. 673, 688 (2000).
91. See Wilkinson, supra note 29, at 181 (quoting Bob Brecher, Surrogacy, Liberal
Individualism and the Moral Climate, in MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 195
(J.D.G. Evans ed., 1987)). But see Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 823 ("[P]rostitution and surrogacy
are fundamentally different, both in process and purpose.").
92. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate
Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21, 24 (1989) ("The most frequent argument ...
against contracts of surrogate motherhood is that they are not truly voluntary, because the
surrogate mother doesn't know what she is getting into and would not sign such a contract unless
she was desperate.").
93. See Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 823 ("It has been argued that the great majority of
gestational surrogates are substantially of lower socioeconomic status than the intended
parents.").
94. As the surrogacy industry has experienced expansive growth only in recent decades, the
available empirical studies on surrogate mothers focus on relatively small sample sizes. See, e.g.,
Todd D. Pizitz et al., Do Women Who Choose to Become Surrogate Mothers Have Different
Psychological Profiles Compared to a Normative Female Sample?, 26 WOMEN & BIRTH e15, e20
(2013) ("Replicating this study with a larger sample size would be a valuable area of future
research [on the psychological profiles of surrogate mothers]."). As such, there is a possibility-
although, a rather unlikely one based on the data that has already emerged-that he risk of
consequences is still omnipresent and might be revealed in later studies with larger sample sizes.
95. See FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 34-35 ("[Mlost women in developed countries
who agree to become either altruistic or commercial surrogates are Caucasian, Christian, and in
their late 20s-early 30s." (citing Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting The Handmaid's Tale:
Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13, 42-43
(2010))).
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conformists."9 6 One study of American surrogate mothers found that
eleven out of the seventeen women surveyed had some form of college
education, thirteen of the women were Caucasian, and four were
Hispanic.97 Although surrogate mothers tend to come from working-
class backgrounds with modest, rather than low, income levels, "no
empirical study ... indicates that any surrogate mothers became
involved with surrogacy because they were experiencing financial
distress."98 Thus, while surrogates are not typically in the same
economic class as the intended parents, they do not turn to surrogacy
as a means of escaping destitution-rather, women who elect to become
surrogates do so of their own volition, simply preferring surrogacy to
other available employment options.99
Moreover, the available empirical data on the psychological
profiles of surrogates indicates that the modern surrogate mother is a
far cry from the trapped reproductive servant portrayed by opponents
of commercial surrogacy. To illustrate, recent research on the
psychological profiles of potential surrogates revealed that "surrogate
mother candidates appear to be a composite of being both bold and
tender, [and] sufficiently hardy to manage the role of surrogacy[ ] as
well as [to] understand[ I the importance of emotional boundary-setting
related to pre-natal attachment."100 Similarly, a longitudinal study on
the psychological well-being of surrogates surveyed twenty surrogates
ten years after the surrogacy process and found that none of the
surrogates surveyed "expressed regrets about their involvement."101 In
fact, the relevant research suggests that surrogates tend to form
96. Lina Peng, Surrogate Mothers: An Exploration of the Empirical and the Normative, 21
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 555, 560 (2013) (citing Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting
The Handmaid's Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CAN.
J. FAM. L. 13, 51-52 (2010)); see also Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough
Waters: An Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 21, 31 (2005) (noting
that "women of color are greatly underrepresented among surrogate mothers").
97. Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting The Handmaid's Tale: Feminist Theory Meets
Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13, 43 (2010) (discussing Melinda M.
Hohman & Christine B. Hagan, Satisfaction with Surrogate Mothering: A Relational Model, 4 J.
HuM. BEHAV. Soc. ENV'T 61 (2001)).
98. Id. at 44; see also Storrow, supra note 44, at 214 ("The data reveal that surrogate mothers
in the United States are not poverty-stricken but are instead educated women who prefer
surrogacy to other options they have to earn income.").
99. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy, 88
IND. L.J. 1223, 1234-35 (2013) (explaining that many military wives, who move often but have
good health benefits, often choose to serve as surrogates to double their household incomes); see
also Peng, supra note 96, at 562 ("There was no evidence in any study ... that indicated the women
were being pressured or coerced into becoming surrogates.").
100. Pizitz et al., supra note 94.
101. See, e.g., V. Jadva et al., Surrogate Mothers 10 Years On: A Longitudinal Study of
Psychological Well-Being and Relationships with the Parents and the Child, 30 HuM. REPROD. 373,
373 (2014).
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stronger emotional bonds with the intended parents than with the
fetus;102 accordingly, surrogates who feel acknowledged for the
altruistic aspects of their work report an even higher degree of
satisfaction with the process.103 Few women report that money is their
sole reason for entering the surrogacy contract. 104 Indeed, many report
that they enjoy being pregnant or are fulfilled by the ability to give life
to a childless couple.105 However, unregulated regimes lack
mechanisms by which to ensure that all potential surrogates are
psychologically capable of bearing someone else's child and have access
to the necessary social support throughout the process.106
Related to the issue of exploitation is the inherent tension
between a surrogate's reproductive autonomy and the nature of
pregnancy, which by definition has "an intense and long-term impact
on the surrogate."107 Once a surrogate contract is executed, "[a
surrogate's] body is literally being used for someone else's purposes in
a constant and inseparable manner."108 Accordingly, some scholars also
view commercial surrogacy as a form of "reproductive slavery," whereby
women are reduced to commodities.109 However, likening surrogacy to
slavery "only works if the surrogate is coerced against her will." 110 The
empirical data illustrates that gestational surrogates in the United
102. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 99, at 1234 ("[T]hese emotional bonds are between adults
rather than with the fetus the surrogate carries and the baby she births.").
103. See id. at 1233 ("Most surrogate mothers, and especially the ones who are particularly
satisfied with the process, report continued relationships and contact with the commissioning
couple. . . .' .
104. This sentiment should, however, be tempered by the observation that "surrogates may be
influenced by social pressure to construct their motivations as altruistic because that is more
socially acceptable than to state money as their sole motivation." Peng, supra note 96, at 564 (citing
HELENA RAGONt, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 71-73 (1994)).
105. See Kerian, supra note 22, at 116 ("Surrogacy is about mature, independent, rational
human beings seeking to benefit one another.").
106. See, e.g., Peng, supra note 96, at 563 ("[S]urrogates may not receive as much social
support as other mothers during pregnancy .. . which could cause them to be more vulnerable than
they otherwise would be.").
107. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 30.
108. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 99, at 1236. Laufer-Ukeles further elaborates: "There is no
going home at the end of the day; there are no breaks and one cannot really quit or get a new job
without complete upheaval and the suffering involved in undergoing an abortion." Id.
109. Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Gestational Surrogacy
Contracts, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391, 398-99 (2012). Commentators that liken commercial
surrogacy to slavery have further suggested that commercial surrogacy perpetuates racial
exploitation because it "enables white couples to procure the services of minority women to serve
as surrogates and bear white offspring." Id. at 407-08; see, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery,
and the Ownership of Life, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139 (1990).
110. Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 838.
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States volunteer to serve as surrogates.11' And principles of decisional
autonomy dictate that surrogates are entitled to choose whether to
gestate a child.112
If such critiques of commercial surrogacy are rooted in any truth,
then it is all the more evident that regulation thereof is necessary. Even
the most adamant critics of commercial surrogacy recognize the need
for regulation to minimize any potential exploitative effects on
surrogates.113 For example, Professor Stephen Wilkinson argues that
commercial surrogacy does lead to the exploitation of poor women. 114
Yet he continues to state that "we should seek to avoid the exploitation
in other ways: by ensuring that surrogates are well paid."115 And while
surrogates are not "financially distressed," studies do indicate that
surrogates are generally less affluent than most intended parents. 116
For example, in 1994, unmarried surrogates' income levels ranged from
$16,000-$24,000 ($26,494-$39,741 in 2017), while the median
household income at the time was $32,264 ($53,426 in 2017) and the
poverty threshold for a single person was $7,547 ($12,497 in 2017).117
While relatively slight when one accounts for the fact that households
encompass more than one person, such an imbalance has the potential
to perpetuate a gap between the contracting parties' bargaining
powers-a gap that cannot be closed by unregulated freedom of
contract.118 The presence of unequal bargaining powers in an
unregulated regime may prove "dangerous and detrimental to the
111. See Kerian, supra note 22, at 139 ("[Women who choose to be surrogates do so willingly.");
Peng, supra note 96, at 566 ("[S]tudy after study has consistently failed to find ... objective indicia
of exploitation in the vast majority of surrogacy arrangements.").
112. See London, supra note 109, at 402-03 (explaining that surrogacy is a "predictable
outgrowth" of feminist advancements allowing women to postpone childbearing and take
ownership of their own reproductive capacities).
113. See Wilkinson, supra note 29, at 185-86 ("[Mly own view is that commercial surrogacy
could be rendered non-exploitative by regulations. . . ."); see also Smolin, supra note 26, at 265-66
(arguing that the legal systems governing adoption should be applied to gestational and traditional
surrogacy arrangements to avoid violating international prohibitions on the sale of human beings).
114. See Wilkinson, supra note 29, at 186 ("[P]ermitting commercial surrogacy may allow poor
women to be exploited .... .").
115. Id.
116. Peng, supra note 96, at 564.
117. Id. (discussing HELENA RAGONt, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART
54-55 (1994)); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND VALUATION OF NONCASH
BENEFITS: 1994, at 25 (1994), https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1996/demo/p60-
189.html [https://perma.cclTZT3-PX23]. The 2017 values were calculated via DOLLARTIMES,
https://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/4DG4-XTAZ].
118. See Yehezkel Margalit, In Defense of Surrogacy Agreements: A Modern Contract Law
Perspective, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423, 440 (2014) (noting that the "unfettered and
unregulated freedom of contract may prove to be very dangerous and detrimental to the women
and children who are involved").
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women who are involved in surrogacy agreements."11 9 As such,
regulating commercial surrogacy contracts will not proliferate abuse of
surrogates-rather, a uniform system of federal regulation is essential
to avoid any feared exploitation.
B. In the Best Interest of Whom?
In addition to concern for the well-being of the surrogate
mothers, opponents further argue that commercial surrogacy threatens
the rights, well-being, and best interests of the children borne through
such arrangements.1 20 First, commentators assert that no one can
represent the best interests of the child during preconception
negotiations, as it is "practically impossible" to determine what a child's
best interests are before that child is even conceived. 121 Many opponents
worry that a child born to a surrogate will ultimately suffer higher
levels of psychological problems than a natural born child due to the
absence of a biological connection with their birth mother.122 Other
child psychologists posit that children will suffer "emotional anguish"
upon learning that they were given up by their birth mother in
exchange for money.123
However, longitudinal studies do not illustrate any recurring
pattern of psychological disorders among surrogate children.124 For
example, Professor Susan Golombok of Cambridge University found
that children born to surrogates were "generally well-adjusted," and
that behavioral issues arose only in circumstances where a child's
mother displayed signs of emotional distress about the child's biological
origins.125 To rebut arguments that children born to surrogates are
119. Id.
120. See Browne-Barbour, supra note 27, at 442-43 ("[P]reconception arrangements cannot be
based upon a true best interest determination [for the child].").
121. Id. at 443, 472 ("Preconception agreements protect the interests of the commissioners,
the gestational woman and brokers. Yet, who protects the best interest of a child produced through
such arrangements?"). While custody is determined in the United States based on the "best
interest of the child" standard, very few courts actually apply this standard when faced with
disputed surrogacy contracts. See FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 22 ("[C]ourts faced with
disputes surrounding surrogacy contracts have looked more often at issues related to the adults
who entered the contract.").
122. See Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 834 ("One of the primary concerns of those opposed to
surrogacy involves the potential harms that may be visited upon the children.").
123. Jennifer L. Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb: Should
Surrogate Mothers Be Compensated for Their Services?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 529,
549 (2007).
124. See Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 836 ('The feared adverse effects on the children have
not significantly materialized.").
125. Susan Golombok et al., Children Born Through Reproductive Donation: A Longitudinal
Study of Psychological Adjustment, J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 653, 657 (2013) ("[The
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distressed to discover their biological origins, commentators point to the
fact that children are rarely embarrassed to learn that they are the
product of IVF. 1 2 6 Accordingly, there is little reason to assume that
children born to surrogates would be devastated to learn that their
parents paid a woman to gestate them.1 2 7 To the contrary, some
scholars suggest that children "may even feel special when they
discover just how much effort and money their parents invested in
bringing about their creation."128
Moreover, concerns for the best interests of the child are
inherently intertwined with the fear that commercial surrogacy reduces
children to traded commodities whose interests cannot be represented
by "adult-centered" market mechanisms.129 Under this approach,
commentators believe that compensation will induce surrogates to act
as carriers for couples who offer the best terms and highest
compensation-not for the couples who are best suited to raise
children.130 Other opponents liken surrogacy to "baby-selling," and
argue that at its core, commercial surrogacy is nothing more than the
sale of children for valuable consideration. 131 Those who view
commercial surrogacy as the commodification of children further fear
that a child born deformed or with genetic defects may be treated as an
"unwanted commodity."132 Yet, if a commercial surrogacy contract is
legally enforceable, intended parents will also be bound by its terms
and, thus, cannot simply cast off a child with undesired maladies.
Objections to commercial surrogacy as the commodification of
children fail when applied to the context of gestational surrogacy.
Unlike under the terms of a traditional surrogacy contract, a
difference in adjustment that was identified for surrogacy children was not indicative of a
psychological disorder."); see also Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 836 (noting that children born via
surrogacy "display essentially the same level of psychosocial development as children born through
natural conception").
126. See Posner, supra note 92, at 24.
127. Watson, supra note 123, at 550.
128. Id.
129. See FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 19 (noting that "market mechanisms are adult-
centered and focus on bargaining power between adults [so] they cannot properly account for the
rights and best interests of children").
130. See Watson, supra note 123, at 548.
131. See Smolin, supra note 26, at 278-79 ("[S]ale of children is transfer of a child for
remuneration or any other consideration.").
132. See FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 20 (explaining that a child can lose his or her
right to nationality and identity when the intended parents find out about a birth defect while the
surrogate is pregnant and subsequently abscond their responsibility for the child, resulting in loss
of protection by international agreements such as the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child);
Kerian, supra note 22, at 156-57 ("Krimmel contends that, 'creating a child without desiring it
fundamentally changes the way we look at children. . . .' (quoting Herbert T. Krimmel, The Case
Against Surrogate Parenting, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Oct. 1983, at 35, 36-37)).
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gestational surrogate has no biological connection to the child she
agrees to gestate.133 Accordingly, a gestational mother has no legal
parental rights or duties to sell-the child belongs to the intended
parents from the outset.134 As Judge Posner explains, "[t]he surrogate
mother no more 'owns' the baby than the father does."135 Much like a
sperm donor who receives "cash, but no parental rights, in exchange for
his donation," a gestational surrogate is not compensated for the
delivery of her child but paid for her gestational services;136 "[t]he fee
paid to the surrogate is not to buy the child, but rather to compensate
the surrogate for her gestational services."137 By treating commercial
surrogacy contracts as employment arrangements, regulating
commercial surrogacy under the FLSA promotes such a view.
C. States as Laboratories: A Failed Experiment
While some may prefer to keep surrogacy beyond the reach of
federal legislation, and instead allow states to act as laboratories of
experimentation, a myriad of issues arise when states are permitted to
take different approaches to regulating gestational surrogacy. One -of
the most pressing issues relating to surrogacy in the United States is
the process of determining legal parentage.13 8 The crux of the matter
turns on whether a state will recognize the gestational surrogate as the
legal mother of the child.139 To date, jurisdictions have expressed a
variety of views on the matter: some courts have endorsed biology as an
"important factor in determining parentage," while others have
indicated that there is no "overriding right" for a child to remain with
his or her biological parents.140 In Johnson v. Calvert, which has been
dubbed the "second most" famous surrogacy dispute in the United
States, the California Supreme Court held that when faced with two
competing claims to maternity, the intention of the parties as
manifested in the surrogacy contract governs the determination of legal
133. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 18.
134. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002); Arshagouni, supra note
26, at 834 ("If the child is not [the gestational mother's], then she has nothing to sell.").
135. Posner, supra note 92, at 28.
136. Id.
137. Kerian, supra note 22, at 154.
138. See Storrow, supra note 44, at 207 ("The second main area of surrogacy regulation in the
United States relates to parentage.").
139. See id. ('The issue at this point in the surrogacy journey is whether the law will recognize
that the surrogate is not the legal mother. . . ."); see, e.g., J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D.
Utah 2003) (deeming it unconstitutional for a state to presume the gestational surrogate is the
legal mother); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 767 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) ("The answer of this
court is that the individuals who provide the genes of that child are the natural parents.").
140. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 21.
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parentage.141 Accordingly, it is wise for intended parents to enter a
surrogacy contract in a surrogacy-permissive state that also recognizes
intended parents as the only legal parents of the child.
However, executing a surrogacy contract in a state that
recognizes the parental rights of intended parents does not foreclose the
possibility of a dispute if a surrogacy contract goes awry. While the U.S.
Constitution requires all states to give "full faith and credit" to the acts
and judgments of their sister states, this guarantee only protects
intended parents who are able to obtain prebirth declarations of
parentage.1 4 2 A prebirth declaration of parentage "provides intended
parents with the most expeditious route to parentage recognition
because it renders amendment of the birth certificate and adoption
unnecessary after the child is born."143 Judgments of legal parentage
obtained prior to birth entitle parents to recognition of legal parentage
in whichever state they ultimately settle. 144 But not all surrogacy-
permissive states permit prebirth parentage orders. For example, New
Hampshire recognizes the right of a surrogate mother to keep the child
up to seventy-two hours after birth, and Texas requires that intended
parents get prebirth judicial approval of surrogacy contracts and file
notice of the birth in order to validate their parental rights. 1 4 5
Ultimately, without a prebirth parentage order, other states are not
bound to recognize the legal rights of intended parents under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.
Simply traveling to a surrogacy-permissive jurisdiction does not
eliminate the legal uncertainty implicated by surrogacy contracts.
Cross-border issues may arise when the intended parents and the
surrogate mother reside in different states and the child is born in a
third. 146 To illustrate, a Connecticut couple discovered that their child
141. 851 P.2d 776, 783-87 (Cal. 1993); Storrow, supra note 44, at 207.
142. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Storrow, supra note 44, at 211 ("Where intended parents
have obtained judgment of parentage, they are entitled to recognition of that judgment by the state
in which they ultimately settle.").
143. Storrow, supra note 44, at 211. By determining that the intended parents are the legal
parents of the child prior to the child's birth, prebirth parentage orders give intended parents
"immediate and sole access to and control over the child and its postnatal care." Steven H. Snyder
& Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth Parentage Orders in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM.
L.Q. 633, 634 (2005). Additionally, prebirth parentage orders enable the intended parents to put
their names on the original birth certificate and hospital records, which in turn "allows the hospital
to discharge the child directly to the intended parents, rather than to the surrogate." Id. at 634-
35. Prebirth determination of parentage can also have "a solidifying effect on the child's insurance
coverage" under the intended parents' policies. Id. at 635.
144. Storrow, supra note 44, at 211.
145. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25(IV) (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.756, 160.760
(West 2017).
146. See Storrow, supra note 44, at 210.
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carried by a surrogate would require multiple heart surgeries.147 The
intended parents offered the surrogate $10,000 to abort the baby.148
Since the contract was executed in Connecticut, which recognizes
intended parents as the parents of a child born to a surrogate, the
surrogate had no legal rights to the child.149 So, the surrogate fled to
Michigan to give birth to the child, as Michigan does not recognize or
enforce surrogacy contracts.150 Since the Connecticut couple lacked a
prebirth parentage order, Michigan was under no obligation to
recognize their parental rights. After giving birth, the surrogate
ultimately gave "Baby S" up for adoption.151 Such scenarios
demonstrate that the individual state laws banning gestational
surrogacy have resulted in significant hardship to intended parents and
surrogates alike-all while failing to accomplish such states' intended
goals of eliminating the practice.152 In this realm, states have failed as
laboratories of legislative experimentation; accordingly, the time has
come for federal regulation of commercial surrogacy.
147. Erik Ortiz, Surrogate Mom Offered $10k to Abort Baby with Disabilities, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Mar. 25, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/health/surrogate-mom-
offered-1Ok-abort-baby-disabilties-article- 1.1279997 [https://perma.cc4F3R-GNAH].
148. Id.
149. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-48a (West 2017) ("[T]he intended parent or parents under
the gestational agreement shall be named as the parent or parents of the child."); Raftopol v.
Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 791 (Conn. 2011) (holding that the surrogate mother did not have parental
rights that required termination because she bore no biological relationship to the child, had not
adopted the child, and did meet the criteria in the artificial insemination statutes).
150. Ortiz, supra note 147.
151. Further complicating the matter was the fact that the Connecticut couple had used an
anonymous egg donor. As Michigan law recognized only the biological father's paternity, the
surrogate was able to put her own name on the child's birth certificate. Id.
152. The Connecticut case is one of many examples illustrating the hardships associated with
the various state approaches to surrogacy and recognition of parental rights. See, e.g., Prashad v.
Copeland, 685 S.E.2d 199 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (extending full faith and credit to custody orders
issued in North Carolina granting a same-sex couple full custody over a child born to a surrogate
in Virginia, which limited the availability of surrogacy to married heterosexual couples). Further,
failing to recognize the intended parents as the legal parents of the child can adversely impact the
surrogate and the child; for example, in the event that the intended parents change their minds
prior to a child's birth, the surrogate may be forced to choose between raising an unwanted child
or abandoning the baby. See, e.g., Brianne Richards, Note, "Can I Take the Normal One?"
Unregulated Commercial Surrogacy and Child Abandonment, 44 HOPSTRAL. REV. 201, 203 (2016)
(noting that it is not an isolated incident when intended parents change their minds regarding a
surrogacy agreement if they divorce prior to the surrogate giving birth).
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III. REVISITING LABOR LAW: A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE SURROGACY
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
This Note is by no means the first to suggest adopting a uniform,
federal approach to the regulation of gestational surrogacy.153 Indeed,
the goal of this Note is not to resolve the litany of moral, ethical,
economic, and political issues implicated by commercial surrogacy in
one fell swoop. Instead, this Note suggests that a framework for
regulating commercial surrogacy contracts already exists in the form of
the FLSA. And, though this Note does not purport to offer an exhaustive
method for implementing this framework,154 it does hope to inspire
support for viewing commercial surrogates as employees entitled to
protection under the FLSA.
To demonstrate why the FLSA provides a tenable framework for
regulating commercial surrogacy agreements, this Part briefly explores
the history of the FLSA. Then, it asserts that the United States
Department of Labor ("USDOL") should promulgate a rule that brings
gestational surrogates under the umbrella of FLSA protection.
Regulating surrogacy in such a manner will preclude the potential
exploitation of surrogates, protect the expectations of both intended
parents and surrogates, and preempt challenges to Congress's
constitutional authority-all without foreclosing the possibility of
altruistic surrogacy arrangements where desired.
A. The History of the Fair Labor Standards Act
A brief examination of the history of the FLSA helps
demonstrate precisely why the statute is uniquely suited to govern
commercial surrogacy contracts. At its core, the FLSA was designed to
protect the most vulnerable members of the workforce from
exploitation. It was enacted in June of 1938 following months of
congressional debates, amendments, and years of judicially stymied
struggles to enact federal protections against labor abuses. 155
Congressional efforts to establish federal labor standards were first
blocked in 1918, when the Supreme Court struck down a law preventing
153. See, e.g., Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 846 (arguing that "we should adopt a federal
gestational surrogacy act"); Havins & Dalessio, supra note 90, at 690-91 (proposing model
legislation for regulating gestational surrogacy contracts); Margalit, supra note 118, at 440
(advocating that surrogacy agreements be "premised upon a regulated, narrower notion of freedom
of contract").
154. This Note is limited to the argument hat the FLSA offers a tenable framework; thus, this
Note will not discuss issues such as state contract law, which would surely be implicated by this
proposal.
155. See Grossman, supra note 39, at 22.
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products manufactured by child laborers from moving in interstate
commerce on the grounds that it exceeded Congress's power under both
the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment.156 Throughout the
1920s, the Court continued to void social legislation on similar
constitutional grounds.15 7
However, the wave of New Deal legislation in the 1930s tipped
the scales in favor of those advocating for federal wage and hour
standards.15 8 President Roosevelt's administration developed the
National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"), which suspended antitrust
laws to reduce competition and enable the enforcement of fair labor
practices.159 Yet the success of the NIRA was short lived: on "Black
Monday," May 27, 1935, the Court invalidated the NIRA's restrictive
trade practices and progressive labor provisions.160 Less than a year
later, in Morehead v. New York, the Court inflicted another crushing
blow on labor reform by declaring that a New York state law, which
mandated minimum wages for female employees, violated freedom of
contract and was therefore beyond the sphere of both state and federal
control. 161
Notwithstanding the Court's clear resistance to federal labor
legislation, the Democratic Party continued to promise national labor
reforms during the 1936 presidential election and suggested resorting
to a constitutional amendment if needed to eliminate child labor and
substandard working environments.1 6 2 President Roosevelt interpreted
his landslide win in the 1936 election as widespread support for New
Deal legislation.163 The final version of the FLSA, approved by
156. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275-76 (1918).
157. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a District of
Columbia law that set minimum wages for female workers as exceeding Congress's constitutional
authority).
158. See Grossman, supra note 39, at 22-23.
159. Id. at 22. For example, under the President's Reemployment Agreement, employers
signed more than 2.3 million agreements that guaranteed minimum wage and maximum
workweeks to approximately 16.3 million employees. Id.; see also 2 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 300, 308-12 (1938) (explaining the
purposes and foundations of the recovery program on July 24, 1933 and issuing the President's
Reemployment Agreement on July 27, 1933).
160. See A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) ("On both
the grounds we have discussed, the attempted delegation of legislative power, and the attempted
regulation of intrastate transactions which affect interstate commerce only indirectly, we hold the
code provisions here in question to be invalid."); Grossman, supra note 39, at 23 ("All nine justices
agreed that the act was an unconstitutional delegation of government power to private interests.").
161. 298 U.S. 587, 610-11 (1936).
162. John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW & CONTEM-P.
PROBS. 464, 464 (1939).
163. Grossman, supra note 39, at 23.
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President Roosevelt on June 25, 1938, set a rigid scale for hours and
wages and prohibited child labor for those younger than sixteen.164
The FLSA was almost immediately challenged on constitutional
grounds. However, in United States v. Darby, the Court declared the
FLSA a permissible exercise of Congress's commerce power, explaining
that it "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce."165 The Court reasoned that the FLSA was an appropriate
means by which Congress could achieve its legitimate end-that is, its
desire to suppress "nationwide competition in interstate commerce by
goods produced under substandard labor conditions."1 6 6 Thus, United
States v. Darby definitively established Congress's power to regulate
wage and hour conditions under the FLSA, concluding that "legislation
aimed at a whole [congressional objective] embraces all its parts."167
Today, the FLSA remains the primary mechanism for
addressing potential employer abuses at the federal level. 168 The FLSA
requires covered employers to pay eligible employees a minimum wage
and an overtime premium at one-half the employees' regular rate of pay
for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. 169 When employers
and employees are covered by the FLSA, its wage and hour provisions
are mandatory and cannot be waived via contract, regardless of the
parties' wishes. 170 The purpose behind the wage and hour provisions is,
in effect, to ensure that workers with the lowest level of bargaining
power are still able to hold their employers to a baseline standard of
decency in the workplace.
However, FLSA protections extend only to "employees" engaged
in interstate commerce. 171 The FLSA defines "employee" rather
circularly as "any individual employed by an employer."1 72 According to
guidance from the USDOL, individual employees engage in interstate
commerce when they "perform work involving or related to the
movement of persons or things, whether tangibles or intangibles, and
including information and intelligence" between states. 173 Engaging in
164. Forsythe, supra note 162, at 473.
165. 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 555-56 (1985) (holding that applying the FLSA to state and local governments did not violate
the Tenth Amendment).
166. Darby, 312 U.S. at 123.
167. Id.
168. TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS
838 (3d ed. 2015).
169. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(), 207(a)(1) (2012).
170. See GLYNN, supra note 168, at 838.
171. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1); see also GLYNN, supra note 168, at 839.
172. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).
173. 29 C.F.R. § 779.103 (2017).
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interstate communication while working also satisfies the interstate
commerce requirement.174 Even individual employees not personally
engaged in interstate commerce will be covered if employed by an
"enterprise engaged in commerce."175 Accordingly, the vast majority of
parties who use brokerage agencies to facilitate their surrogacy
contracts would satisfy the commerce requirement.
Consistent with the FLSA's stated goal of protecting workers
with lower levels of bargaining power, independent contractors cannot
avail themselves of the FLSA's wage and hour protections. Independent
contractors tend to have more specialized skills and thus, more
bargaining power than the average worker.176 Jurisdictions apply a
wide range of multifactor tests to determine whether an individual is
an employee or an independent contractor, but under each test the
amount of control that an employer exerts over the employee is the most
determinative factor.177 The FLSA also contains a number of
exemptions for otherwise covered workers-including individuals
employed in "white collar" professions, managers, and
administrators. 178 Such exemptions further highlight the fact that the
FLSA's protections exist mainly to protect the most vulnerable
members of the labor force.
B. Why the Fair Labor Standards Act?
The FLSA provides a suitable framework for regulating
commercial surrogacy agreements for four primary reasons. First, the
FLSA's remedial background makes it an apt candidate for regulating
commercial arrangements. Second, FLSA coverage also benefits
intended parents, as it encourages the parties to use agencies and
articulate contractual obligations ex ante. Third, the FLSA is flexible
such that parties who wish to enter altruistic arrangements will not be
subjected to federal oversight. Fourth, regulating commercial surrogacy
under a preexisting framework forecloses constitutional challenges.
First, the FLSA was enacted to prevent historic abuses of labor
and to guarantee protections for workers with lower levels of bargaining
174. GLYNN, supra note 168, at 839.
175. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1).
176. See, e.g., Ansoumana v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184, 192 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (applying the "economic reality test" to determine that Duane Reade delivery workers were
employees and thus entitled to FLSA protections because the delivery workers' actions were
integral to Duane Reade's business).
177. See, e.g., McCary v. Wade, 861 So. 2d 358 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (applying the common-
law test to determine that a lumber hauler was an independent contractor because he purchased
his own tools and set his own delivery schedule).
178. 29 U.S.C. § 213.
2018]1 311
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
power.179 As discussed supra in Section II.A, one of the most oft-cited
arguments by opponents of commercial surrogacy is that the practice is
inherently exploitative because it puts women of lower socioeconomic
status at risk of abuse.18 0 Requiring intended parents to adhere to the
FLSA's minimum wage requirements will ensure that surrogates are
appropriately compensated and assured a baseline level of working
conditions-thereby protecting surrogates from any perceived
exploitation, compensatory or otherwise. Characterizing surrogates as
employees will not relegate surrogates to reproductive slaves or
prostitutes; rather, providing surrogates with employee status will
promote reproductive autonomy by allowing women to choose to enter
into the recognized occupation of gestational surrogacy.18 1 Indeed,
recognzing surrogacy as a profession under the FLSA legitimizes what
many women already see as a viable and desirable-not essential-
means of earning a living. 182 As one study of American surrogates
found, "far from being 'used' or exploited" the participants made it very
clear that they wanted to serve as surrogates, often in spite of the
negative reactions of friends and family. 183
Regulating commercial surrogacy as a form of legitimate
employment under the FLSA would likely encourage intended parents
and surrogates to use surrogacy agencies in order to satisfy the
interstate commerce requirement. Promoting the use of surrogacy
agencies ensures that most, if not all, gestational, surrogate candidates
undergo screening and psychological counseling before agreeing to a
contract.184 Such screenings allow both parties to be fully informed
about what the process will entail and to agree on how to handle
conflicts before they might arise, avoiding the difficult scenarios
exemplified by the situation of the Connecticut couple discussed in
Section II.C. 185
Second, intended parents would also benefit from FLSA
coverage. Since the FLSA only covers employees, not independent
contractors, the intended parents will have to exercise a certain degree
179. See GLYNN, supra note 168, at 838.
180. These arguments are addressed at length supra Section II.A.
181. While this Note acknowledges that endorsing surrogacy under the FLSA may not bar
states from criminalizing the practice, regulating the market in the vast majority of states will
likely reduce the cost of surrogacy; the lack of a uniformly legalized surrogacy regime "artificially
limits the supply of surrogacy agencies, medical specialists, and gestational surrogates, thereby
further increasing costs." Arshagouni, supra note 26, at 808.
182. See Peng, supra note 96, at 562.
183. Id.
184. See Holcomb & Byrne, supra note 21, at 650-52 (explaining that surrogacy agencies
screen all parties involved and "arrange for any necessary medical and psychological testing").
185. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
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of control over the surrogate's activities during the pregnancy to remain
under the FLSA's coverage. Such control could include selecting the
surrogate's doctor, maintaining the ability to attend appointments, and
mandating that the surrogate communicate with the intended parents
throughout the pregnancy about diet and exercise. Providing intended
parents with greater control in exchange for steady payment to the
surrogate would foster a degree of accountability among the parties.8 6
Subjecting the contracting parties to federal oversight will further
increase consistency among states, by, for example, enabling intended
parents to obtain prebirth parentage orders that eliminate any
possibility of confusion about parental rights after the child's birth.187
And, extending FLSA coverage to commercial surrogates will encourage
all parties to detail their wage, hour, and other expectations in the
contract itself, reducing the possibility that a surrogate candidate
might renege or later demand more compensation. 188 Given that many
surrogates and intended parents do not know one another prior to
entering into a contract, providing a sense of security to both parties is
critical to the success of the surrogacy.18 9
Additionally, a more uniform system will help reduce the cost of
surrogacy by making it more accessible,190 which, in turn, will offset
hesitations that intended parents might have about paying surrogates
a minimum hourly wage.191 In the vast majority of cases, subjecting
intended parents to minimum wage requirements would not increase
the cost of a surrogacy agreement. Currently, in jurisdictions that
permit payment of surrogates, the average surrogate earns anywhere
between $20,000 and $55,000.192 Assuming a surrogate is in a
jurisdiction where the minimum wage is $7.25, paying a surrogate for
nine months of labor-deducting eight hours a day for sleep and
186. Holding parties accountable for their contractual obligations is critical to avoiding the
emotional custody battles detailed supra Section II.C.
187. See Snyder & Byrn, supra note 143, at 634 (discussing how prebirth parentage orders
benefit the intended parents by granting them "immediate and sole access to and control over" the
baby once it is born).
188. See, e.g., supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text; see also Mike Kilen, Who is Baby
H's Parent? Iowa Legal Battle Pits Surrogate Against Couple Who Hired Her, DES MOINES REG.
(Aug. 29, 2017, 8:14 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2017/08/29/who-baby-hs-
parent-iowa-legal-battle-pits-surrogate-against-couple-who-hired-her/580
7 3 7 0 01/ (last updated
Sept. 5, 2017, 12:01 PM) [https://perma.cc/55PL-RV94].
189. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 99, at 1232 (discussing the realities of the relationships
between surrogate mothers and intended parents).
190. See supra note 181.
191. See id. at 846 ("A federal approach would achieve uniformity more quickly, and it would
obviate any forum shopping within the United States.").
192. FiNKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 7. This range does not include the associated
medical, agency, legal, or other costs.
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including overtime193-amounts to $42,920. This amount is well within
the established range of fees currently paid to surrogates.194
Third, bringing surrogates under the FLSA's protections will not
eliminate altruistic surrogacy arrangements or foreclose the possibility
of flexible agreements. If the intended parents and the surrogate know
and trust one another prior to entering the agreement, the parties can
readily avoid the FLSA's coverage by maintaining an independent
contractor relationship. 195 In such a situation, the intended parents will
likely feel more comfortable relinquishing a degree of control to the
surrogate, as opposed to in a commercial transaction brokered by a
surrogacy agency.196 Ultimately, the purpose of providing surrogates
with FLSA coverage is to protect the rights of a potential surrogate by
characterizing her as an employee-entitling her to greater protections
and assured compensation. Regulating surrogacy under the FLSA
reserves a degree of flexibility for situations in which such protection is
unnecessary, for example, where a friend or relative offers to serve as a
surrogate.
Finally, there are enormous advantages to regulating surrogate
agreements under a preexisting statutory framework. As detailed
earlier in this Note, proponents of the FLSA fought long and hard to
obtain the Court's stamp of constitutional approval.197 Having the
USDOL promulgate a rule through the notice-and-comment process
pursuant98 to its powers under the Administrative Procedure Act will
avoid challenges to Congress's constitutional authority to regulate
labor.199 As Congress has delegated the authority to the USDOL to
193. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
194. FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 7. Even in states with higher minimum wage rates,
such as California, the cost of a surrogate would be $58,800 (((10.5 x 8.0) + (15.75 x 8.0)) x 280 =
58,800). See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1182.12 (West 2017). And, perhaps the most famous intended
parents of 2017 are paying their surrogate $45,000-just slightly more than an arrangement under
the minimum wage calculations that this Note proposes. See Maria Puente, Reports: Kim
Kardashian and Kanye West Hire a Surrogate to Carry 3rd Baby, USA TODAY (June 21, 2017, 6:30
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/storyllife/people/2017/06/21/reports-kim-kardashian-and-kanye-
west-hire-surrogate-carry-3rd-baby/103083250/ [https://perma.cc/7MAX-Z5BBI.
195. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2012) ("Every employer shall pay ... his employees who in any
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in
an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce . . . .").
196. See, e.g., Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 99, at 1226 ("What makes surrogate motherhood so
difficult to navigate is that it is a transaction in commercial intimacy, and it is hard to take account
of commerciality and intimacy simultaneously.").
197. See supra Section III.A.
198. Using the notice-and-comment process is a critical component of this proposal, as the
process permits opponents the opportunity to voice concerns and requires the USDOL to consider
such comments. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
199. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (establishing procedural requirements for informal rulemaking
by agencies).
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promulgate rules carrying the force of law in this area, such a rule
extending FLSA protection to surrogates would only be subject to highly
deferential review under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.200 Such a rule would, admittedly, announce a new position on
whether surrogacy constitutes a form of legitimate employment subject
to federal regulation. However, it is not inconsistent with the agency's
past rulemaking actions, as the agency has continually regulated labor
and wage conditions since United States v. Darby soundly established
its authority to do so. 2 0 1 Nor would such a rule rise to the level of such
extraordinary impact on an entire sector of the economy such that the
agency's interpretation of its authority to regulate the labor conditions
of covered surrogates be impermissible.20 2
Moreover, a USDOL rule governing surrogacy is quite
reasonable in light of several of the USDOL's recent revisions to federal
regulations for domestic workers.203 In 2013, the USDOL extended
federal overtime and minimum wage protection to previously exempted
domestic workers by (1) eliminating provisions exempting third-party
employers from paying minimum wage and overtime to domestic
workers and (2) narrowing the definition of "companionship services."
These changes illustrate a willingness to provide previously exempted
domestic workers with FLSA coverage.204 Moreover, the USDOL has
promulgated a rule providing that where employees are required to be
on duty for twenty-four hours or more, employers and employees may
agree to exclude "a bona fide regularly scheduled sleeping period of not
200. 468 U.S. 1227 (1984). This Note acknowledges that the status of Chevron deference has
been subject to much debate since Justice Gorsuch's appointment o the Supreme Court. However,
as this Note goes to press, Chevron remains intact; thus, this Note applies the doctrine as it stands
today.
201. 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
202. Cf. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (denying Chevron deference to the
IRS's interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 36B, finding "[i]t is especially unlikely that Congress would
have delegated this decision to the IRS," given the massive political and economic significance of
the issue).
203. Domestic service employment means "services of a household nature performed by a
worker in or about a private home." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #79D: HOURS WORKED
APPLICABLE TO DOMESTIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 1
(2016), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs79d.htm [https://perma.cc/DW92-HR3H].
Section 202(a) provides the USDOL with the authority to regulate such employment, as it provides
that "the employment of persons in domestic service households affects commerce." 29 U.S.C.
§ 202(a) (2012).
204. LEE HANSEN, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 2015-R-0276, NEW FEDERAL DOMESTIC WORKER
REGULATIONS 1 (2015), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2015/rpt/pdfl2015-R-0276.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9LS8-G7GD]. Companionship services "means the provision of fellowship and protection for an
elderly person or person with an illness, injury, or disability who requires assistance in caring for
himself or herself." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET: APPLICATION OF THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT TO DOMESTIC SERVICE, FINAL RULE 1 (2013), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/
compliance/whdfsFinalRule.htm [https://perma.cc/SD8W-MQRB].
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more than eight hours worked."205 This provision in particular provides
a model for devising a similar rule with regard to surrogates and
overtime payments.
In sum, the fractured nature of the commercial surrogacy
industry and its resulting consequences for intended parents, surrogate
candidates, and children borne through such arrangements indicate the
need for federal regulation in this area. While this Note acknowledges
that bringing commercial surrogacy under the FLSA's purview would
be a substantial undertaking, the FLSA nevertheless offers a means of
protecting the interests of both surrogates and intended parents. And,
multiple features of the FLSA-including the overarching goal of the
statute, and the DOL's rulemaking authority and willingness to
regulate domestic workers-indicate that the FLSA provides a feasible
method for beginning to establish a uniform approach to regulating
gestational, commercial surrogacy.
CONCLUSION
The increasing availability of gestational surrogacy in recent
years has triggered an enormous amount of discussion among scholars,
human rights advocates, economists, and the media. The vast range of
opinions about whether commercial surrogacy is exploitative or
empowering to the surrogate, harmful or helpful to the child, and
whether intended parents or the gestational surrogate are entitled to
parental rights are all reflected within the United States' borders.206
However, the legal minefield posed by the fifty different approaches to
regulating commercial surrogacy has resulted in artificially high costs
and uncertainty as to the parental status of both surrogates and
intended parents. Accordingly, the time has come for federal regulation
of surrogacy contracts.
The FLSA, which was enacted specifically to prevent labor
abuses and to ensure basic minimum wage and overtime protection,
provides a preexisting statutory framework for regulating commercial
surrogacy arrangements. Both intended parents and surrogates will
benefit from the predictability promoted by federal oversight, and
because the FLSA governs only employees-not independent
contractors-regulation under the FLSA will not foreclose altruistic
arrangements where desired by the contracting parties. Since it is
soundly established that the FLSA was enacted pursuant to Congress's
205. 29 C.F.R. § 785.22 (2017).
206. See Storrow, supra note 44, at 206 (explaining that the United States "constitutes a
microcosm of the wider global variation in the regulation of surrogacy").
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constitutional authority,207 extending FLSA coverage to surrogates
through the USDOL's rulemaking authority will circumvent
constitutional challenges to federal power over surrogacy
arrangements. As such, the FLSA offers a tenable framework for
regulating commercial surrogacy.
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207. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-22 (1941) (noting that Congress exercises
its granted power when it regulates interstate commerce, and that this power extends to interstate
activities, such as labor standards, which affect interstate commerce); see also Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 560 (1985) (holding that the Commerce Clause gives
Congress the power to regulate wage rates and employment hours under the FLSA).
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